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University of Michigan 
This paper analyzes the impact of a 20 percent import surcharge on all U.S. imports 
and on imports from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil. The analytical frame- 
work is based upon the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade. We also 
discuss the methodology and results of two recent papers on the effects of an import 
surcharge. The empirical results indicate that, while the macroeconomic consequences 
of an import surcharge would be limited, significant intersectoral trade and employment 
adjustments would take place. The competitive position of U.S. tradable industries 
may improve or deteriorate depending on whether the dollar depreciates or appreciates 
in response to the import surcharge. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the first months of 1985 various legislative proposals for reducing 
the U.S. trade and budget deficits were set forth in the U.S. Congress. 
These proposals included a 20 percent surckarge on all imports or on 
imports from selected countries, especially those with large trade sur- 
pluses with the U.S. The ostensible purpose of the general surcharge 
was to increase government revenues while, at the same time, lowering 
imports. The selective measures were intended to curb import flows 
and thus to bring pressure to bear on the affected countries to open 
their markets to U.S. goods. 
However, none of these measures was passed by Congress during 
1985, because of doubts about their effectiveness and also because 
they faced a certain veto by President Reagan. The subsequent sharp 
depreciation of the dollar, beginning in September 1985, temporarily 
relieved the trade concerns of Congress, and the import surcharge issue 
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was pushed further into the background. But the persistence of the 
trade deficit in early 1986, coupled with heightened political awareness 
of trade as an issue for the 1986 elections, resulted in a renewal of 
Congressional enthusiasm for restrictive trade measures. Thus, on May 
22, 1986 the House of Representatives passed a comprehensive trade 
bill containing a wide array of trade measures. Selective import re- 
strictions were mentioned as one possible form of punishment for 
countries with "unfair" trade restrictions that affected U.S. interests 
adversely. 
Although these various proposed measures have been discussed 
and debated in political circles and in the media, the measures have 
not been analyzed to any great extent by academic economists. The 
purpose of our paper, accordingly, is to undertake such an analysis 
in order to clarify some of the important conceptual issues and the 
magnitude of the effects involved. The framework for our analysis 
is based upon the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade. 
In our paper we focus in: ~ c u l a r  :on the effects of general and se- 
lective import surcharges that might be imposed by the United States 
if the Congress succeeded in forcing the President's hand. Although 
the Michigan model is primarily suited for detailed sectoral analysis 
of various trade measures, it may also provide insight into some re- 
lated macroeconomic questions. In carrying out our analysis, we 
shall have occasion to discuss the methodology and results of two 
recent papers on the effects of an import surcharge. Rousslang and 
Suomela (1985) use a partial equilibrium approach to analyze the 
sectoral trade adjustments to a U.S. import surcharge, while Klein, 
Pauly and Petersen (1985) carry out various surcharge simulations 
with the LINK econometric model and primarily emphasize the ma- 
croeconomic effects involved. 
In Section 2 of our paper we present a theoretical framework based 
on the Michigan model for analyzing the surcharge and then describe 
the various policy experiments. Section 3 compares the Michigan 
model to Rousslang and Suomela's partial equilibrium approach. It is 
assumed here that trade flows determine the exchange rate. On this 
basis, we analyze the impact of a general 20 percent surcharge on all 
imports and, alternatively, the economic adjustments that might occur 
if there were a 20 percent selective surcharge on imports from Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil. In a final section, we assume that 
a general 20 percent import surcharge on all goods leaves the exchange 
rate unchanged and relate the results of the Michigan and Project LINK 
models. 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AN IMPORT SURCHARGE 287 
2. REPRESENTATION OF AN IMPORT 
SURCHARGE IN THE MICHIGAN MODEL 
The Michigan model, which is set out in detail in Deardorff and 
Stern (1986), captures detailed economic relations among 34 countries 
in 22 tradable and 7 nontradable goods industries. One of its basic 
characteristics is that producers and consumers of each country distin- 
guish, within the tradable industries, between home goods, which are 
produced and consumed domestically, and those that are exported or 
imported. Different demand and supply functions therefore exist for 
home and export products. It is further assumed that demanders regard 
home-produced and imported goods as imperfect substitutes, but im- 
ports from various foreign countries as perfect substitutes. The latter 
is in contrast to some computational trade models in which imports 
are differentiated with respect to country of origin and bilateral export 
and import functions are defined (e.g., see Brown 1984). 
The supply side of the model is based on profit maximization in 
each industry. Perfectly competitive exporters and producers for the 
domestic market combine labor, domestic and imported intermediate 
inputs, and a fixed amount of capital to produce an optimal amount 
of output. This leads to supply functions which depend on the product 
price and the cost of the various inputs: 
x s x px S i j  = ij 1i, . . . ' ,  p~ml . . p i  m ,  w i j ,  K ~ )  
j =  1 . . . . .  n i = 1 . . . . .  m (1) 
S h = S ~  ( p ~ ,  p ) ,  . . . p ~ , , ,  p , ~  . . .  P i ~ ,  w , j ,  K S )  
J =  1 . . . n' and i = 1 . . . m  (2) 
where 
x h Sij,Sij 
W/j 
n 
n '  - n = number of nontraded goods, 
m = number of countries. 
= supply of good j by country i, export and home sectors, 
respectively, 
= domestic price of exports of good j in country i, 
= home-sector price of good j in country i, 
= domestic price of import good j in country i, 
= (total) capital stock of industry j in country i, 
export and home sectors, respectively, 
= nominal wage rate in sector j of country i, 
= number of tradable goods, 
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Once the profit-maximizing level of output of an industry is determined, 
input demand functions are readily obtained. 
Utility-maximizing consumers make a choice between imported and 
domestically produced consumption goods and base their decisions on 
relative prices and their level of income. Total demand for home and 
imported goods is found as the sum of final and intermediate demand 
and can be written as 
O~ = O~ (p~, ph, E,, S~i, "" "Sh,,, S~,.-.Sign), (3) 
D h = D~j (P,i, ph,  Ei  ' shl h m ,~ " ' 'S i , ' ,  ~ t ' ' ' ~ n ) ,  (4) 
where 
D~ = demand of imports of good j in country i, 
D~ = demand for products of home sector j in country i, 
E~ = aggregate expenditure in country i. 
Output levels appear in the demand functions because they determine 
the demand for intermediate inputs. 
Equality between domestic supply and demand yields the equilib- 
rium prices of home goods. The import and export prices of a good j 
are related to the world price pjW, which guarantees equilibrium between 
total world demand and supply. Exporters receive the domestic equiv- 
alent of the word price,1 
P~ ipj, (5) 
where 
R i = exchange rate of country i (domestic currency 
per unit of numeraire currency). 
Tariffs further increase the domestic prices of imported goods. Hence, 
m m w Pij = Ri(1 + tit) Pj, (6) 
where 
t~ = a d  v a l o r e m  tariff on imports of good j into country i. 
In a flexible exchange rate system, the exchange rate adjusts to maintain 
balance of payments equilibrium and can therefore be calculated from 
~Export taxes are specified in the Michigan model, but ignored in this simple exposition. 
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where 
n 
p~' (S~j - DiT) + Bi k° = 0, (7) 
j = l  
Bi k° = exogenous capital inflow in country i. 
Equations (1) through (7) provide the basis for studying the effects 
of an import surcharge in the Michigan model. A 20 percent surcharge 
on all imports is represented by adding 20 percentage points to the 
current levels of all tariff rates. Similarly, we can analyze the effects 
of increasing tariff rates on U.S. imports from particular countries. 
These tariff measures raise the domestic prices of imported products 
in equation (6). Consumers will shift from imported to home goods 
and producers will buy more intermediate inputs from domestic sup- 
pliers. This higher demand for domestically produced goods pushes 
up their price, which reverses part of the initial decline in import 
demand. More expensive home goods also affect intermediate pro- 
duction costs, which were already increasing in response to higher 
import prices. Producers in the home goods sector are more than 
compensated for these increases by higher output prices and demand. 
However, prices of export goods are determined internationally and 
are not likely to adjust enough to maintain export profits at the same 
level. In fact, in all experiments in this paper, declining import demand 
in the country with the import surcharge (the U.S.) leads to lower 
world prices. Consequently, profits of export firms unambiguously fall 
in response to the surcharge. Therefore, export production declines, 
while the output of other firms expands, entailing a reallocation of 
labor from the export to the home goods sector. 
In the Michigan model, the response of total production and em- 
ployment to an import surcharge depends crucially on the macroecon- 
omic assumption made about aggregate expenditure. Imposing tariffs 
and using tariff revenues to reduce the government budget deficit de- 
creases aggregate expenditure and causes unemployment. Since few 
policymakers would be likely to advocate an import surcharge if a 
substantial number of jobs were to be lost, we assume in our experi- 
ments that aggregate expenditure adjusts to maintain the same overall 
employment level. One way to achieve such constant employment is 
by expansionary monetary or fiscal policy. Obviously, if expansionary 
fiscal policy is conducted, part of the tariff revenue is spent again so 
that the reduction in the budget deficit would be less than our results 
suggest. Furthermore, there are other effects of fiscal and monetary 
policies that may serve to limit declines in employment. For example, 
290 Filip Abraham et al. 
a reduced government budget deficit is likely to lower interest rates, 
limit international capital inflows, bring about a depreciation of the 
dollar, and stimulate investment in home and export production. 
These links among the deficit, the rate of interest, and the exchange 
rate have often been cited by proponents of the import surcharge. They 
argue that a surcharge would correct the overvaluation of the dollar 
and thus restore the competiveness of U.S. producers. Yet it is hard 
to predict how the dollar will react to an import surcharge. For example, 
if this policy measure, by reducing import demand more than con- 
tracting export production, improved the trade balance, the dollar might 
well appreciate. In that case, analyzed in the first and second exper- 
iments below, a reduced budget deficit helps to stabilize aggregate 
employment, but the exchange rate is assumed to be determined by 
trade adjustments to the import surcharge. In their paper, Rousslang 
and Suomela make the same assumption about the exchange rate, which 
allows us to compare the methodology and results of their study and 
our own. Alternatively, in a third experiment, we assume that the 
dollar is fixed at its initial value, so that the import surcharge leaves 
the exchange rate unchanged. This scenario is considered in one of 
the Project LINK simulations, so that we are also able to compare the 
LINK and Michigan models in more detail below. 
We assume throughout the paper that there is no retaliation of other 
countries against the U.S. import surcharge. One could argue that most 
European countries would welcome lower real interest rates and would 
therefore refrain from strong retaliatory action, while Japan would, at 
most, stop its limited efforts at opening its domestic markets to U.S. 
exports. On the other hand, in the presence of renewed protectionist 
sentiments all over the world, a U.S. import surcharge could easily 
trigger a costly trade war. In that event, all countries would suffer 
and, in ignoring this possibility, our results might be overly optimistic. 
We now turn to the experiments where the exchange rate is deter- 
mined by the balance-of-payments equilibrium. We first discuss Rouss- 
lang and Suomela's partial equilibrium approach to the import 
surcharge. Subsequently, the results of  both studies are presented. 
3. AN ~ T  SURCtt,t~___C~ WITH A TRADE- 
DETEItMINID EXCHANGE RATE 
3A. The Partial Equilibrium Approach to an Import 
Surcharge 
Rousslang and Suomela seek to measure the impact of  a U.S. import 
surcharge on the U.S. trade balance, exchange rate, and government 
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revenues. They follow closely the methodology developed by Basevi 
(1968), who only models the foreign sector of the economy and does 
not distinguish between export and home-good production or between 
traded and nontraded goods. He postulates supply and demand func- 
tions for exports and imports, which are then solved for the equilibrium 
exchange rate. Export supply depends on the own export price and 
can be written as: 
S ~ (pX) (lb) 8 6  = ij ij 
Similarly, the domestic price of imports is the main determinant of 
import demand: 
m m m Dij = Do(pi j) (4b) 
Foreign exporters supply more imports to the home market when the 
product price in foreign currency goes up. For simplicity, the foreign 
currency is taken as the world currency so that foreign suppliers of 
good j receive the world price p W. In that case, the supply function 
of exports becomes 
m m w s,j  = so(p~ ) (8) 
where 
S T = supply of imports of good j to country i 
Foreign consumers buy more import goods when import prices in 
foreign markets go down. Since retaliation is not considered, foreign 
tariff changes can be ignored. Thus, demand for exports of country i 
responds directly to changes in the world price: 
D 0 = Di~(p;), (9) 
where 
= foreign demand for exports of sector j in country i. 
In equilibrium, import demand equals import supply and the same 
holds for exports. Recalling the definition of import and export prices 
in equations (5) and (6), the equilibrium quantities of exports (X~j) and 
imports (Mij) can be solved as a function of the exchange rate and the 
tariff structure: 
Xij = Xij (gi) ( 1 O) 
M o = M o (Ri, ~)  ( l l )  
In a flexible exchange-rate system, the equilibrium exchange rate is 
derived from the equilibrium requirement for the balance of payments. 
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The only remaining exogenous variables are the tariff rates. With the 
necessary estimates for import and export e l a s t i c i t i e s ,  2 the effects of 
an import surcharge o n  Mi j  , Xi j  , and Ri can be calculated. 
There are several important differences between Rousslang and Suo- 
mela's partial approach and the Michigan model's general equilibrium 
approach. 
1. Since Rousslang and Soumela do not take into account the role 
of intermediate inputs in the production decisions of export firms, 
their specification in equation (lb) does not capture the inter- 
mediate cost effects of the import surcharge and their negative 
impact on export production. 
2. The absence of intermediate inputs also affects Rousslang and 
Suomela's import demand equation (4b), since output levels do 
not appear as explanatory variables. Yet as a result of the import 
surcharge, fewer intermediate inputs are purchased abroad. 
Hence, Rousslang and Suomela's framework ignores one source 
of lower import demand. On the other hand, they make no dis- 
tinction between home goods and imports. Rising prices of home 
goods thus do not offset part of the initial reduction in imports. 
For this reason, Rousslang and Suomela overestimate the neg- 
ative impact of the surcharge on final import demand. 
3. In the partial equilibrium approach, world prices are exogenously 
given to producers and consumers in each country. The absence 
of a world trade equilibrium rules out any indirect transmission 
of the import surcharge via changing world prices. In the ex- 
periments with the Michigan model, the U.S. import surcharge 
significantly lowers world prices, which further reduces export 
profits but also reverses part of the decline in the volume of 
imports. In addition, lower word prices also increase the value 
of total imports, because, in the Michigan model, price elastic- 
ities of import demand are larger than one in all tradable indus- 
2All estimates of supply and demand elasticities are, admittedly, only best "guesstimates". But 
Rousslang and Suomela's selection of supply elasticities is open to question. Following BaseVi, 
they use estimates provided by Floyd (1965). Floyd's preferred estimate for the export supply 
elasticity is 4.5, and he puts the import supply elasticity at 6.1. These estimates apply to all 
industries, and there is no sectoral dissagregation~ Presumably, Rousslang and Suomela use these 
aggregate figures for all industries. In contrast, in the Michigan model, there is considerable 
variation in supply elasticities across industries with a low of 0:5 in agriculture to a high of 3 I. I 
in the petroleum industry. 
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. 
tries. In ignoring world price adjustments, Rousslang and 
Suomela's partial equilibrium approach may overestimate the 
trade balance improvement caused by the import surcharge. 
From the previous discussion, it becomes clear that Rousslang 
and Suomela's analysis does not allow for any negative feedback 
of tariff changes on exports. Thus, unless intermediate inputs 
are a very important component of total imports, their results 
will exaggerate the negative import effects of the surcharge. The 
trade balance is therefore likely to improve more in their partial 
equilibrium model, which would lead to a stronger appreciation 
of the exchange rate. 
3B. The Effects of a 20 Percent Surcharge on all Imports, with 
Flexible Exchange Rates 
Turning to the results, the main conclusions are as follows: 
1. If the U.S. were to impose a 20 percent surcharge on all imports, 
this would raise domestic prices of imports and hence lower 
import demand. The U.S. trade balance would improve and, in 
this first experiment, there would be an appreciation of the dollar. 
Our computational results suggest that the dollar would appre- 
ciate by 5.2 percent with respect to the yen and 4.7 percent with 
respect to the Deutsche Mark. The overall trade-weighted effec- 
tive exchange rate of the dollar would appreciate by 4 percent. 
The dollar appreciation would make American products more 
expensive abroad so that exports would fall until trade equilib- 
rium was restored. In Rousslang and Suomela's experiment the 
dollar appreciates by 14.4 percent, which as expected, is well 
above the appreciation in the Michigan model, reflecting a larger 
trade balance improvement. 
2. An import surcharge would generate tariff revenues that might 
help to reduce the U.S. budget deficit. A 20 percent surcharge 
on all imports would raise the share of government revenues in 
GDP by an estimated 1 percent, which in 1985 prices would 
amount to $38.6 billion of additional revenues and a 19.1 percent 
reduction in the current U.S. budget deficit of $202 billion. In 
the Rousslang and Suomela study, the budget deficit improves 
by $55.8 billion. 
3. The Michigan model measures the welfare effects of trade policy 
with standard partial equilibrium welfare estimates, based upon 
changes in total expenditure plus consumer and producer surplus. 
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In the case of a general 20 percent import surcharge, the U.S. 
would experience a decline in economic welfare of an estimated 
$5.5 billion, which corresponds to a 0.14 percent loss in GDP. 
This would be a continuing loss in welfare as long as the sur- 
charge remained in effect. 
In Table 1, we compare the two studies in terms of the sectoral 
trade adjustments to an import surcharge. Since Rousslang and Suo- 
mela only report the absolute changes in the sectoral trade balance 
without mentioning the source and year of their trade data, we have 
calculated the percentage shares of each sector with a trade balance 
improvement or deterioration in relation to all industries positively or 
negatively affected by the surcharge. Thus, for example, the result for 
agriculture in the first column indicates that the trade balance of that 
sector improved as the result of the surcharge and that its surplus 
accounted for 7.3 percent of all sectoral trade surpluses. The sectoral 
trade balance of the food, beverages, and tobacco industry in the same 
column shows a deficit, amounting to 11.6 percent of the total trade 
deficit in all negatively affected industries. 
As could be predicted, Table ! indicates that, in the Rousslang and 
Suomela experiment, fewer industries incur a sectoral trade-balance 
deficit. Except for agricultural products, all industries with a trade 
deficit, including food, beverages, tobacco, printing and publishing, 
chemicals, and nonelectrical machinery, also suffer trade losses in the 
experiments with the Michigan model. But the Michigan model sug- 
gests substantial trade deficits in the textile and leather industries. 
caused by a significant decline in exports. The absence of intermediate 
inputs in the partial equilibrium approach may explain this difference 
in results. Both studies find the most significant trade surpluses in the 
petroleum, rubber, other manufactured products, and transport indus- 
tries. These are the sectors with the largest reductions in import demand 
and the best opportunities for import-competing firms to capture a large 
share of the domestic market. As far as sectoral trade adjustments are 
concerned, our results and those of Rousslang and Suomela are fairly 
similar on the whole, with a correlation coefficient between them of 
0.46. The differences noted stem primarily from the general equilib- 
rium interactions which are captured by the Michigan model. 
One of the main drawbacks of Rousslang and Suomela's study is 
the lack of information about sectoral employment changes. It is true 
that, up to a point, trade balance and employment adjustments are 
closely related. A sectoral trade balance surplus, for example, indicates 
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production. This implies that the expansion of import-competing do- 
mestic firms exceeds the decline in exports, and we therefore expect 
total sectoral employment to increase. Yet, there is no doubt that most 
policymakers are interested in a more quantitative assessment of in- 
terindustry employment shifts. For this reason, Table 2 presents per- 
centage and absolute sectoral employment changes in response to a 
general 20 percent import surcharge. The absolute employment figures 
in the fourth column are obtained by applying the percentage changes, 
calculated in the model, to 1985 U.S. employment data. 
An important feature of Table 2 is the reaUocation of labor from 
the tradable to the nontradable sectors. A general 20 percent import 
surcharge would displace 321,001 workers from tradable to nontrad- 
able industries. The net employment decline in the tradable sector 
furthermore implies that, in total, m o r e  Jobs are lost in export firms 
than created in import-competing domestic industries. Our calculations 
thus suggest that an import surcharge may actually result in a decline 
in U.S. manufacturing employment. 
The employment and wade balance changes for the tradable indus- 
tries contain considerable sectoral variation. The rubber, petroleum, 
other manufactured goods, and nonmetallic minerals industries would 
apparently experience a rise in employment as a result of a general 20 
percent import surcharge. Yet, except for rubber products, 3 employ- 
ment gains are well under 2 percent of industry employment. In most 
other industries employment would fall in response to a 20 percent 
import surcharge. The employment declines are especially noteworthy 
in agricultural and food products, textiles, leather, paper and paper 
products, chemicals, nonferrous metals, nonelectrical machinery and 
electrical machinery. 
3C. A 20 Percent Surcharge on Imports from Japan, Brazil, 
South Korea, and Taiwan 
As mentioned, some of the current import-surcharge proposals target 
selected countries with large surpluses in their trade with the U.S. In 
this section we analyze the impact on the U.S. economy of a 20 percent 
surcharge on imports from only Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
3The large positive employment effect in the rubber products industry is a result of what we 
believe to be the unusually large elasticity of demand for imports in that sector. The large negative 
effect in the leather products industry, on the other hand, may result from an inconsistency in 
our data on output and trade in that sector, and should be discounted accordingly. 
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Brazil. As in the first experiment, the exchange rate is assumed to be 
flexible. 
The macroeconomic impact of this policy is comparatively small. 
The effective exchange rate of the dollar would appreciate by 1 percent, 
the general price level would increase by 0.2 percent, and welfare 
losses would be much smaller than in the earlier experiments. The 
share of government revenues in GDP would rise by an estimated 0.2 
percent, which would yield $8.3 billion of additional revenues and 
reduce the (1985) budget deficit by 4 percent. 
In the experiments of Rousslang and Suomela, the selective import 
surcharge is only imposed on imports from Japan. If we conduct the 
same experiment, we find that the dollar would appreciate by 0.8 
percent and the budget deficit would be reduced by $6 billion. Rouss- 
lang and Suomela find a $6.3 billion increase in government revenues 
and a stronger 2.1% appreciation of the dollar. 
As is seen in Table 3, the sectoral adjustments to an import surcharge 
against Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil are smaller than in 
the case of a 20 percent surcharge on all imports. Nearly 71,000 
workers would be reallocated from tradable to nontradable industries, 
and the agriculture and food, textile, leather, paper and paper products, 
chemicals, and nonelectrical machinery sectors again show declines in 
employment. Small employment gains are now found in such sectors 
as iron and steel, metal products, and wearing apparel as well as in 
other manufactured products. These are industries in which Japanese, 
Brazilian, South Korean, and Taiwanese import penetration is gen- 
erally the strongest and added tariff protection would therefore provide 
expansion possibilities for import-competing finns. The sectoral trade 
and employment adjustments to an import surcharge against Japanese 
products only are similar and reasonably close to the results of Rouss- 
lang and Suomela. 
4. A 20 PERCENT IMPORT SURCHARGE, WITH A FIXED 
EXCHANGE RATE 
The macroeconomic models of several countries are linked together 
in a consistent world trade system in Project LINK. Its primary goal 
is to forecast the path of macroeconomic variables such as GNP, 
aggregate employment, inflation, and total exports and imports over 
time. The main orientation of LINK is therefore macroeconomic, and 
in this light, it has only a limited sectoral disaggregation into four 
industries. As already noted, the Michigan model is geared towards 
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croeconomic features are kept simple. Adjustments in aggregate ex- 
penditure are assumed to maintain full employment. In this way, fluc- 
tuations in total employment are deliberately ruled out, in order to 
focus on intersectoral employment shifts. 
The structure of the LINK country models reflects the project's 
dominant macroeconomic orientation. Although it is impossible to 
summarize the variety of individual country characteristics, it is safe 
to say that most models are Keynesian in spirit and based on the identity 
between GNP and aggregate demand: 4 
GNPi = Ei  + X i  - Mi. 
Demand functions are then estimated for the various components of 
aggregate demand. Import demand is specified as a function of ex- 
penditure and relative prices: 
= O F (P~, Ei). (4c) D~ 
/30E/ 
Except for some countries, intermediate import demand is generally 
ignored. 
The supply side of most country models consists of a set of price 
equations, which relate output prices to wage rates and costs of im- 
ported materials but not to output levels. This implies that, at the 
prevailing market price, supply is infinitely elastic as would be the 
case with a constant-returns-to-scale technology. In some countries 
demand variables are included in the price equations, indicating an 
imperfectly competitive market structure. At the same time, however, 
demand functions are estimated, which makes a correct interpretation 
of the price equation difficult. Ignoring this ambiguity, we write the 
export price equation as 
x __. x P i j ) ,  (2c) Pi j  PO (Wij '  M 
where 
P~ = price index of ~ materials used in industry j of country i. 
Equation (2c) is best understood as the inverse of a supply function 
such as equation (2). 
The LINK project seeks to tie the individual country models together 
in a consistent world trade system. At the heart of the LINK approach 
are two fundamental world trade identifies. A first condition states that, 
for each good, the quantity exported by one country must be equal to 
the quantity imported by the country's trading partners: 
'~rhe description of the LINK model is based on Ball (1973), Klein and Su (1979), and Klein 
(1985) 
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I l l  
X m S o = ~ aijkDkj (12) 
k = l  
where 
~k = ratio of exports of good j from country i to country k 
aqk = O-~kj 
to the total imports of country k of product j (D~) 
The exports of each country are evaluated by equation (12) as a 
weighted sum of partner country imports. A similar identity must hold 
in value terms. After adjusting for exchange rates and tariffs, the import 
value of a good for a country must equal the value of exports supplied 
by foreign producers. Hence, 
m m m Pkj Dkj = (1 + t kj) 
or, substituting from equation (12), 
m Pkj = (1 + t~) 
m 
i = 1 
i n  
aok p} ,  (13) 
i = 1 
where 
= estimate of average tariff rate on good j in country k. 
Equation (13) expresses the import price as a weighted average of 
partner country export prices. Since export prices and import demand 
are given by equations (2c) and (4c), (12) and (13) can be solved 
iteratively for the export quantities and import prices, consistent with 
world trade equilibrium. 
An import surcharge not only increases import prices directly in 
equation (13), but also pushes up output prices of exporting firms [see 
equation (2c)]. Depending on the magnitude of the export shares, a0k, 
this indirectly puts additional pressure on import prices, which further 
reduces import demand. Hence, in LINK, an import surcharge results 
in higher international goods prices, while world prices fall in the 
Michigan model because of lower import demand. This different result 
is explained by LINK's assumptions about the supply function. When 
export supply is infinitely elastic, export prices are entirely cost de- 
termined and not lowered by the decline in import demand. As a result, 
both the export and import price response to a surcharge are expected 
to be stronger in the LINK surcharge experiments. The final adjustment 
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of import demand is more difficult to predict because the import losses 
in the LINK model, due to rising world prices, may he dominated by 
the reduction in intermediate imports in the Michigan model. 
The impact of the surcharge on the volume of exports also differs 
in the LINK and Michigan models. Equation (12) defines exports in 
LINK as a weighted average of partner country import demands. The 
weights a0k are not directly influenced by the tariff policy so that the 
competitive position of export firms in the country with the surcharge 
does not deteriorate vis-d-vis foreign exporters. The direct relation 
involving the surcharge, the cost of intermediate inputs, and export 
supply is missing from the LINK model. As a result, exports in the 
country with the surcharge only go down in proportion to the general 
decline in world import demand. For this reason, a surcharge leads to 
a stronger contraction in the export sector of the Michigan than of the 
LINK model. 
Because of the ambiguous results for import demand, it is not pos- 
sible to say whether the trade balance will improve more in the LINK 
than in the Michigan model experiments. In any event, the trade bal- 
ance surplus does not cause an appreciation because exchange rates 
are exogenously givenl This exogeneity assumption implies that, al- 
though the LINK model contains a monetary sector, the interaction 
between the money and foreign exchange markets is not modeled 
explicitly. 
4A. The Effects of A 20 Percent General Import Surcharge, 
with a Fixed Exchange Rate 
In the experiment discussed in this section, the import surcharge 
leaves the exchange rate unchanged. By reducing the budget deficit, 
the surcharge lowers the real interest rate, which reduces international 
capital flows to the U.S. and offsets any positive trade balance effects 
on the exchange rate. The same assumption about the exchange rate 
is made in the LINK simulations, but the design of the experiments 
is somewhat different. Klein et al. (1985) consider the one- and five- 
year effects of a three-year sliding surcharge from 1986 to 1988, with 
rates of 20 percent, 15 percent, ar~ 7 percent, respectively. To allow 
a comparison with the results of the Michigan model, we focus on the 
first-year adjustments to the 20 percent surcharge. The major results 
are as follows: 
1. As expected, export and import prices react more strongly to the 
import surcharge in the LINK model than in the Michigan model. 
The U.S. import-goods price deflator in the LINK model shows 




a 20.2 percent increase, while the LINK estimate for the U.S. 
export-goods deflator increases by 2.6 percent. In the Michigan 
model, import prices go up by an average of 16.4 percent, while 
export prices fall by 0.8 percent due to lower world prices. 
In sharp contrast to the 10.1 percent export decline in the Mich- 
igan model, export production is virtually unchanged in the LINK 
experiment. Import demand falls substantially more in the Mich- 
igan ( - 2 2 . 7  percent) than in the LINK model ( - 4 . 2  percent). 
This may be the consequence of intermediate input demand, but 
may also reflect slow adjustment of imports over time. That is, 
much of the change of imports in LINK takes place in the second 
and third year and the combined import reduction after five years 
of the three-year sliding surcharge is 14.9 percent. 
The LINK study provides a wide range of macroeconomic es- 
timates. The LINK results suggest that the surcharge would cause 
a small reduction in GNP of 0.2 percent, which would lead to 
0.2 percent more unemployment in the United States. Interest 
rates would fall and the consumer price index would increase by 
about 0.6 percent. The federal deficit would be reduced by $59.8 
billion, compared to only $37.4 billion in the Michigan model. 
Because of the limited sectoral disaggregation of the LINK 
model, the Michigan model provides more detailed information 
about sectoral employment shifts. Table 4 shows that, if the value 
of the dollar remains unchanged when the surcharge is imposed, 
there is an employment shift from the nontradable to the tradable 
sectors. Export production will fall because of more expensive 
imported inputs, but the decline is less pronounced now as com- 
pared to the previous experiments since the dollar does not ap- 
preciate. As a result, more tradable sectors experience a net 
employment gain than in the first experiment. Total employment 
in tradable industries increases by approximately 180,000 man 
years. Obviously, the sectors which gained in the previous ex- 
periment would continue to do so, but, in addition, agricultural 
and food products, transport equipment, metal products, and 
chemical industries expand. Textiles, leather, and nonelectrical 
machinery are among the major victims of the surcharge in this 
second experiment. 
5. CONCLUSION 
An import surcharge might help to resolve some current economic 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































308 Filip Abraham et al. 
would help to reduce the government deficit, lower imports, and stim- 
ulate production for the domestic market. On the other hand, the 
general price level would rise, economic welfare would go down, and 
jobs would be lost in the export sector. In the aggregate, employment 
and production effects would be limited. 
A major goal of an import surcharge is to strengthen the competitive 
position of U.S. industries. But, as our computations suggest, this goal 
is only attained if the dollar does not appreciate in response to an 
import surcharge, because an appreciation substantially reduces U.S. 
export strength, which might reduce total employment in several im- 
portant U.S. tradable industries. In case a surcharge were directed only 
at countries with large surpluses in their trade with the U.S., the results 
suggest comparatively small effects in the aggregate but some inter- 
sectoral employment adjustments are likely to occur. 
In the alternative scenario in which the exchange rate is assumed to 
remain unchanged with the imposition of a surcharge, the employment 
effects are positive for most but not all tradable industries. The plau- 
sibility of these two exchange-rate scenarios clearly depends on which 
macroeconomic effects are believed to be the most realistic. Consid- 
ering the small aggregate adjustments, the experiments that assume 
flexible exchange rates appear to us the most credible. 
Reviewing the partial equilibrium effort by Rousslang and Suomela, 
we noted that their approach left out the role of intermediate inputs 
and did not capture the repercussions of world trade adjustments on 
the U.S. domestic economy and the rest of the world. Accordingly, 
one should view their estimates of an import surcharge with some 
skepticism. As for the Michigan and Project LINK approaches, it 
appears that LINK's macroeconomic orientation and limited sectoral 
disaggregation make it more suited for analyzing the macroeconomic 
aspects of a U.S. import surcharge. The Michigan model explicitly 
abstracts from macroeconomic interactions and offers instead a more 
detailed insight into the sectoral trade and employment adjustments 
that would be associated with an import surcharge. 
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